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1;3ELGIUM, FRANCE. GERMAN fEDEAAL Ae-Pusuc. rTALY. LUXEMBOURG, THE NETHERLANDS 
E.E.C. PROPOSES AGRICULTURAL NEGOTIATING PLAN 
FOR KENNEDY ROUND 
The EEC has proposed that the Kennedy Round 
trade negotiations now in progress should 
deal with the amount or "margin" of support 
for farm products in establishing balanced 
world agricultural trade. ~he margin of 
support for any corrnnodity is defined by the 
Corrnnunity as the difference between the 
world market price of the product and the 
payment actually received by the farmer.) 
The single factor common to almost all GATT 
members in the field of agriculture is the 
support given to production, the EEC has 
found. Discussions on the amount of such 
support would go far beyond arrangement for 
market access or continued income support 
for inefficient farmers, under the EEC 
proposal. 
GATT provisions are practically the same 
for agricultural and industrial products, 
since the GATT was established at a time 
when food shortages and balance-of-payments 
difficulties were the dominant problems. 
Thus, the EEC says, new measures are needed 
for the changed world agricultural situation. 
Negotiations on the margin of support would 
aim at the binding of a maximum support 
margin, Binding would no longer be re-
stricted to tariffs; it would freeze the 
over-all effect of all support measures for 
all farm products. 
The value of such binding would depend on 
the level at which the maximum support mar-
gin were bound. Ideally, the EEC says, it 
would represent a fair compromise between 
domestic agricultural and political reali-
ties and the world trade situation. Bound 
supports would stabilize the conditions of 
access to import markets, since these could 
not be upset by unforeseen changes in sup-
ports. 
The EEC Corrnnission considers that the bind-
ing of the Corrnnunity's support margin would 
be an important trade concession, It would 
curtail the scope of the EEC levy system in 
the future and would, as a result, curb the 
natural tendency of its output to expand. 
Rapid output growth is now forecast because 
of the application of technical advances to 
the relatively backward European farm pro-
duction, 
SETTING THE SUPPORT MARGIN 
Machinery would be established for setting 
the reference price used to determine the 
amount of support. The reference price 
could be either a price calculated on the 
basis of world market prices or prices at 
the frontier during a base period, The 
GATT parties could negotiate a reference 
price when automatic methods were deemed 
unsuitable, The actual payment received 
by the farmer on the home market would be 
the average annual price at the farm, plus 
any direct subsidies. 
Binding of margins of support would not 
require harmonization of amounts of support 
by the GATT parties. 
The Connnunity proposal deals with the 
amount of support rather than the kinds of 
support given. It lays stress on the over-
all effect of all measures and leaves the 
ultimate control over the measures with 
the governments. 
SCOPE OF BINDING RULES 
GATT parties would pledge not to exceed the 
support ceilings agreed upon in the Kennedy 
Round negotiations. 
The EEC proposes that such connnitments be 
made for three years. During this period, 
the support margin could be altered if the 
exchange rates between two parties were 
changed. In addition, the bound support 
margin could be increased if prices on the 
world market or free-at-frontier offer 
prices fell below the reference price. The 
reference price could serve as a price 
stabilizer in international trade, since it 
would discourage offers at a lower price level. 
A price bracket would be set rather than a 
single reference price so that changes 
would not be caused by minor price fluc-
tuation. 
If a GATT party. found it necessary to ex-
ceed the bound support level due to unusual 
circumstances, it could do so. The party 
would then be required to grant compensa-
tion to other parties, especially if the 
increase had led to a greater supply on the 
world marker. 
The EEC has emphasized that all bindings 
should be made on a reciprocal basis. This 
rule would not necessarily be applied, how-
ever, to developing countries. 
WORLD COMMODITY AGREEMENTS PROPOSED 
The Community has proposed that, in addition 
to bindings for support margins, the GATT 
parties should conclude world agreements 
for the most important farm products in 
international trade. The agreements would 
cover products for which a permanent im-
balance between supply and demand exists. 
World commodity agreements might be con-
cluded for wheat and feed grains, beef, 
butter, sugar, and oil-bear.ing fruits and 
seeds. 
Agreements would aim at the achievement of 
stable prices on the world market at a fair 
and profitable level, long-run equilibrium 
between production and demand, and the 
elimination of short-term fluctuations. 
Existing demand must be expanded, and the 
developing countries· food needs must be 
met. Since agreements would not merely 
provide for market sharing, but for new 
general rules for agricultural trade, they 
might curtail supply and production. 
Each agreement would cover a certain per-
centage, fixed in advance, of world trade 
in a given commodity. All GATT parties 
participating significantly in this trade 
would be invited to take part in the agree-
ment. The agreements would not, however, 
be tied to GATT, thus allowing the eventual 
accession of member countries of the U. N. 
and its specialized agencies who are not 
GATT parties. 
In the world agreements, the reference 
price would serve as a balancing price in 
international trade and a long-term guide 
price. Reference prices for commodities 
covered by world agreements would be ne-
gotiated rather than automatically set. 
Countries taking part in the agreements 
would have to undertake certain supple-
mentary commitments. For example, pro-
ducing countries would agree not to accumu-
late new surpluses. Other obligations 
might prescribe certain results to be 
obtained while leaving the means up to the 
countries concerned; some would deal with 
the means used themselves. 
The Community has said that food aid to 
the developing countries should be further 
increased and diversified. The developing 
countries should not be considered as 
dumping grounds for surplus output and aid 
should not have the effect of restraining 
the development of farm production in these 
countries. 
COMMON POLICY-FOR S GAR PL NNED 
The six EEC member countries have decided 
to create a common organization for the 
sugar market, now that similar organiza-
tions have been set up for all other major 
farm products. 
The situation in the world market has also 
stimulated planning for a connnon sugar 
policy. The International Sugar Agreement 
has not proved fully workable and the world 
market price has risen sharply. The EEC 
Connnission views its proposal for a common 
policy as a contribution to the needed re-
organization of the world sugar market. 
Community producers would benefit from the 
proposed policy since sugar consumption --
unlike almost all other farm products -- is 
steadily increasing. In the period 1950/51 
to 1960/61, sugar consumption in the EEC 
countries rose 36 per cent. It now stands 
at 5.7 million metric tons of raw sugar a year. 
EEC sugar production fluctuates sharply 
from year to year. In 1959/60 EEC pro-
duction totaled 4,662,000 metric tons. The 
following season, 6,342,000 tons were pro-
duced in the same area. 
SITUATION IN THE SIX 
The sugar industry in the six EEC countries 
varies considerably. All members are agreed 
that a stable and balanced market under the 
common policy is desirable. 
The three Benelux countries pursue a more 
liberal sugar policy than do France and 
Germany, where government regulation is 
extensive. There are differences between 
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SUGAR SUPPLY AND DEMAND IN THE EEC 1961/62 
(production as% of consumption) 
Belgium-Luxembourg 
France 
Germany (FR) 
Italy 
Netherlands 
EEC 
129 
101 
78 
78 
108 
91 
current prices for refined sugar and between 
prices for the unrefined raw material --
sugar beet. However, differences between 
refinery prices for white sugar, excluding 
taxes but including other charges, are 
small enough to permit price harmonization 
among the Six. 
In the Netherlands, a relatively large pro-
ductive capacity is spread among a small 
number of efficient refineries. The Nether-
lands has traditionally both imported and 
exported sugar. 
The German Federal Republic, also an import-
ing country, had the highest beet prices in 
the Corrnnunity until 1962/63. In order to 
limit acreage used for beet production, 
restrictions were imposed on cultivation. 
Germany had an agreement with Cuba requiring 
it to buy certain quantities, but this 
accord is no longer in force. 
France is the only EEC country with large 
quantities of sugar available for export. 
Among the signatories of the International 
Sugar Agreement, only France and Belgium 
are export~rs; the other EEC members are 
importers. 
WHITE SUGAR PRODUCTION IN THE EEC 
(in 1000 metric tons) 1963/64 
Germany (FR) 
France 
Belgium-Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Italy 
A LOOK AT THE WORLD MARKET 
2,050 
1,980 
348 
383 
_fil 
5,083 
World sugar stocks have been steadily de-
creasing since 1960/61 when they totaled 
17,235,623 metric tons. At the end of the 
1963/64 season they are expected to be 
8,421,566 tons. Compared with this is the 
monthly world consumption of about 4,647,000. 
The sharp drop in stocks is one of the main 
reasons for current high world market prices, 
since low stocks insure that future supplies 
will be strictly controlled. 
Consumption has been increasing at the same 
time as stocks have fallen. In Western 
Europe (excluding Britain) consumption rose 
15 per cent between 1958/59 and 1962/63. 
Adding increases in United States consump-
tion, the increase for this period reaches 
16.7 per cent. This amounts to an annual 
increase of 3.34 per cent. Sugar experts 
now predict an increase of 16.1 per cent 
for the period 1962/63 to 1967/68 -- 3.22 
per cent a year. Thus the annual increase 
would be 6,655,000 metric tons. 
The future organization of the EEC sugar 
market will take the current world market 
system into account. The expansion of con-
sumption, which will last for some time, 
indicates that the Community will continue 
to find outlets for its excess sugar pro-
duction. On this basis, the Commission has 
proposed a relatively liberal system for 
organizing the Community sugar market. 
WORLD SUGAR TRADE 1963/64 (in metric tons) 
Production 54 315 790 
Imports 18 678 050 
Initial stocks 9 367 926 
Total 82 361 766 
Final stocks 
Deliveries 
Exports 
Consumption 
8 421 566 
73 940 200 
18 175 500 
55 764 700 
The current world market price of 100 kilo-
grams (220 lbs.) of raw sugar is $21.25, 
while the EEC refinery price (excluding 
tax and charges) is $19.50. The proposed 
regulation would be the first under which 
a levy will be paid on exports; under ear-
lier EEC farm regulations, exports have 
been subsidized. 
The Commission proposal is not only linked 
to the wotld sugar situation, it is also 
tied to the grain picture and to the EEC 
common grain price. There is a natural 
relation between the two products, since 
wheat usually follows beets in crop rota-
tion. The EEC is seeking to restore the 
balance between the two prices. 
HOW SUGAR POLICY WOULD WORK 
The organization of the EEC sugar market is 
based on the policy already established for 
grains. 
Each year prior to November 15, the member 
states would set a target price for white 
sugar at the refinery using a single quality 
standard for the entire Community. A common 
target price for all six countries is the 
objective of the sugar policy. A price 
bracket would be used the first year per-
mitting the Six some range of choice in 
setting the target price. 
The members would also set annually a sup-
port price for white sugar. This price 
would be based on the target price but 
would be from five to ten per cent lower. 
A minimum price for sugar beets - - the raw 
material for Corrnnunity production -- would 
also be fixed by the Six . Sugar producers 
would be required to purchase beets at this 
price. 
Each member would be compensated for its 
sugar storage expenses for the last nine 
months of the season. Sugar manufacturers, 
refiners and importers would contribute to 
the financing of these payments. 
SUGAR TRADING SYSTEM 
Prices would be maintained through the 
sugar trading system. Levies would make 
up the price difference between importing 
and exporting countries. 
The sugar levy would be the difference be-
tween the threshold or minimum import price 
and the offer price. Levies would be used 
for both intra-Corrununity trade and trade 
with non-members, but intra-Corrununity levies 
would disappear when a single sugar price 
was established. 
Threshold prices would be set each year for 
both raw and refined sugar. These prices 
should be set at a level permitting imported 
sugar to sell at the target price with a 
small additional preferential margin for 
Corrununity producers. For raw sugar, the 
threshold price would also include a trans-
formation coefficient applicable to the 
entire EEC. 
The base price to which the levy is added 
for imports from non-members would be the 
offer price including insurance and freight 
charges. This price would be set each day 
by the EEC Corrunission on the basis of the 
lowest offer price on the world market. 
The fluctuating world sugar market could 
create conditions in which the offer price 
was higher than the threshold price. The 
importing country could be given import 
supports calculated in the same way as the 
levy. Imported sugar would thus be sold at 
the internal market price. 
Exporting countries would pay an exporting 
levy when the Corrununity price was lower 
than the world market price. This levy 
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would be equal tG the difference between 
the offer price and the target price less 
transport costs. 
All imports and exporcs would be controlled 
by the issuance of certificates for a fixed 
duration. Import certificates could be 
withheld when the internal market price 
falls below the reference price for a 
product. This price, set annually, would 
be between the target price and the support 
price and would be the same for all member 
countries. 
Rebates would be payable as a means of stimu-
lating sugar exports. The rebates would 
cover the difference between the world 
market price and the support price in the 
exporting country. A rebate system would 
also be applied in intra-Corrununity trade. 
The levy system proposed by the Corrunission 
would prohibit the use of other traditional 
means of protection: tariffs, taxes in 
lieu of tariffs, quantitative restrictions, 
minimum prices, and state aids which would 
upset the levy system. 
The corrunon sugar policy would be operated 
by a sugar management corrunittee similar to 
those existing for other products. The 
Corrunission has proposed that Italy begin 
applying the Corrununity price system on 
• 
July 1, 1964 and that the other EEC coun-
tries begin applying it on October 1. The 
sugar trading system would begin on the same 
Before the corrnnon policy for sugar can be 
applied, the EEC Council of Ministers, 
date . • 
composed of representatives of the member 
countries, must approve the Conunission proposals. 
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